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SQe Mortgage.

For Beneflt of Creditors.-An assignee for the benefit of creditors
in Pennsylvania may make a valid sale at a public auction room in
Philadelphia of lands of the insolvent situated in New Jersey, if
such sale is fairly and properly conducted, and in the absence of
proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that the assignee did
his duty: .Pemberton v. Klein, Ct. of Chan. N. J., 1887.
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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. See Bills and Notes.
Authority of Counsel to Make Stipulations-Estoppel-Rehearing
-Failure of Counsel to Offer Evidence.-Defendant submitted the
bill of plaintiffi to NV., a counselor at law, who, conceiving that he
had full authority to act for defendant, entered into a stipulation
with plaintiffs' counsel waiving service of process and the right to
file answer, and admitting the facts stated in the bill. W. represented defendant at the hearing of the case before the chancellor
and the master. Held, that defendant's employment of W., and
appearance with him in the subsequent stages of the suit, without
objection to the stipulation, and plaintiffs' prosecution of the suit
in reliance upon the stipulation, estopped defendant from denying
the authority of W. to make the stipulations: Patterson v. Read,
Ct. of Chan. N. J., Oct. 21, 1887.
Dafendant moved for a rehearing, on the ground that his counsel
had not offred evidence before the master which he was urged to
put in. Hld, that the counsel not deeming the evidence necessary
to the proper conduct of the case, at best it was but an error in
judgment, and no ground for a rehearing: Id.
BAILMENT.

Deposit- Ordinary Diligence- Use by Bailee.-Where a bailee
not for hire allows money to be deposited in his safe for safe-keeping,
and without his fault the safe is robbed, the owner must bear the
loss: Carlyon v. Fitzhenry, S. Ct. Ari., Sept. 1, 1887.
In such a case, if the bailor consents to the use of the money by
the bailee, and a robbery occurs before there has been such use of
the money, the bailor must bear the loss: Id.
BANKS AND BANKING.

See Bills and Notes- Checks-Forgery.

BILLS AND NOTES. See Contract-Limitation.
Bona fide Purchase-FutureConsideration-Negotability.-Ifit
were known to the transferee of a negotiable promissory note, acquired for value and before maturity, on taking it, that the consideration was future and contingent, and that there might be offsets
against it, this would not make him liable to the equities between
the original parties: State Nat. Bank v. Cason, S. Ct. La., July 5,
1887.
It cannot affect the negotiability of a note that its consideration
is to be thereafter realized, or that from some contingency it may
never be enjoyed: Id.

Collection Fee.-A stipulation for an unreasonable attorney fee is
void: Kimball v. Moir, S. Ct. Ore., Nov. 21,1887.
Estoppel.-Maker of judgment note and his assignee cannot set
up failure of original consideration against one who bought it on
the representation of the maker that it was good: Wilcox v. Rowley, S. Ct. Pa., Oct. 3, 1887.
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Intr,.qt.-Oinission of the words " until paid " in a note bearing
iitere.t will not ble rectified in equity on the ground that the parties
thought the words unnccessary: Hicks v. Coody, S. CE. Ark.,
Oct. 22, 1887.
Where "a note stipulates for ten per cent. interest until maturity,
that rate does not continue after maturity : Ilamcr v. R gby, '. Ut.
Miss., -Nov. 21, 1887.
Imlo,'s",; "for collection" may sue, but subject to the same defences as the payee: Wilson v. Tobon, S. Ct. Ua., March 14, 1887.
IYon-2Xeotiable.-INote proving for seizure of property sold:
South Bnd Ironl Works v. Paddock, S. Ct. Kan., Nov. 5, 1887.
CITECKS.

)f',norandihn on.-A practice among banks not to observe niemoranduni upon checks has the sanction of law: 5tatt iXat. Bank v.
Rcilly, S. Ut. Ill., 1887.
CONSIDERATION.

See Contract-Jlorgage.

CONSPIRACY.

Requisites of ComplainL.-A complaint charged a conspiracy on
the prart of defendants to control the coal trade ii the city of M.,
and the injury to plaintiff resulting directly therefriom, connecting (ciondant by overt acts in the carrying out of such conspiracy.
Hld, that the complaint stated a cause for action: Mfarray v. 3cGarigle, S. Ct. Wis., Oct. 11, 1887.
CONTEMPT.

Affirmance on Appeal-Power of Trial Court to remit Fine.-Ahere
a party has been found guilty of contempt, and a fine imposed, and
the case appealcd to the Supremne Court, which court affirms the
judgment appealed from, the trial court has no power afterwards to
modify or remit the fine imposed: It re Gr'fin, S. Ct. N. C., Oct.
24, 1887.
CONTINUANCE.

Di.wretionof Tri'd Cout.-An application for the postponement of
a trial, on the ground that the attorneys of the party are engaged
in anot her trial, i-i ad(hre-ed to the discretion of the trial court ; and
the Supreme Court of Indiana will not reverse for a refusal to postpone the trial, unless it cl,.arly appears that there was an abuse of
the discretion: Evansville & I. B. Co. v. Hwkins, S. Ct. lId., Sept.
28, 1887.
CONTRACT. See Municipal Corporations.
PablicPolicy-Agreement for "Lobby Services."-It is against public policy for a p) rson to hire limielf out to perform• lobby services" with niemnbers of the legislature, and a contract for such services is illegal and invalid: Sweeney v. 31cLeod, S. Ct. Ore., Oct.
17, 1667.
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CRIMINAL LAW.

Resisting Arrest by Private Person without Warrant.-A private
person may, in a temperate manner and without a warrant, arrest
one who has just committed a felony; and it is murder for the
person so attempted to be arrested to kill one whom he knows is in
fresh pursuit and endeavoring to arrest him for such felony: State
v. Mowry, S. Ct. Kan., 1887.
Practice-PeremptoryChallenges-Talesmen.-Ina criminal action
after the peremptory challenges allowed a defendant have been exbaustfd, he will not be permitted to withdraw his challenge to one
of the rejected jurors, and have him substituted in the place of a
talesman that has been called to complete the jury: Biddle v.
State,Ct. App. Md., June 21, 1887.
DAMAGES.

In an action of claim and delivery, the verdict of the jury was
that the goods be delivered up to the defendant, or that lie recover
a certain sum as the value thereof. The sum mentioned was in
excess of the highest value of the goods proved in evidence. -Held,
that, although the attention of the trial court was not called to this
variance at the rendering of the verdict, and before the jury were
discharged, and although the motion for new trial was made and
denied proforma without argument, the appellate court would reverse the judgment and order a new trial, unless both parties consent to a modification of the judgment by reducing it to the proved
value of the goods: North Star Boot and Shoe Co. v. Braithwaite,
S. Ct. Dak., Feb., 1887.
DEDICATION. See Municipal Corporations.
That Constitutes-Platand Sale of Lots.-The act of dividing up
a parcel of land into lots, streets, and alleys, and selling lots with
clear reference to a map or plan respresenting such divisions, is an
immediate and conclusive dedication of such streets and alleys to
the use of the purchaser and of the public: Schneider v. Jacobs,
Ct. App. Ky., Sept. 22, 1887.
DEED.

Construction-ExstingRights of Parties.-Therespondent, under
a claim of right, had maintained certain drains for more than twenty
years, through an avenue, a private way belonging to L., and with
his knowledge, when the respondent bought land from L. bounded
on said avenue. The deed contained the clause: "It is distinctly
understood by and between the parties hereto that there shall be no
right of frontage on or access to the said avenue for any land of
this grantee, except for the parcel hereby conveyed." After receiving the deed, respondent continued his drains as before through said
avenue. Held, that the clause did not affect respondent's right of
drainage acquired by twenty years' adverse use before lie took the
deed: Fiske v. Wetmore, S. Ct. R. I., July 30, 1887.
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ESTOP:L.

See Allon'y and Clicnt -Bills and .Vohes.

T'1.)
Deny D, lit',,y of IFrillitn Guir, ty-Dlircr! to Bn'fieiry.'-,tic' of -lte, tane- JJ'hea Unneed.-try.-One who signs a guara:ty,and intrusts it with tile per.,,n fbr whom he thus becoilms re,T,,Iible, is est pped from claiming that lie diI not athorize its
delivelV to the obligec: Snyder v. Olick, 8. (t. ind., Oct. 20, 1S87.

Whewre a guaranty is direct and certain, and the thing guaranteed
i. d.filnite in amount, and known to the guarantor, or might have
been known by him by the exercise of ordinary care, at the time
the guaranty was given, nntie of tile acceptan'e of such guaranty
is not e,,.essarv in order to hind the guarantor; andl upon prformance of the consideration on which it rests, the contract becomes
complete and enfbrceable : 1d.
FORGERY.

Notwithstanding § 5209, U. S. Rev. Stat., a State court can try
the bookkeeper of a, National bank, who without authority filled a
draft signed in blank by the assistant cashier, and also made false
entries in his books to conceal tie ihct : loke v. The People, S. Ct.
Ill., 1887.
FRATUDULEN-T CON VEYA-NCFS.

See Iff.4band and JI~fe.

Gon reilm," ly C'edilr-Tnt-Iowhed,.' of Vendc.-W. sold
goods to pilaintiff, the clerk in his store, by an absolute conveyance,
taking in payment the motes of plaintiff due in one, two, and three
yearS. Deftndants, at the instance of creditors of W., levied u)on
amnl sold the goods, and ior detfnce claimed that the sale to plaintill' by W. was for the purpose of " hinderinur, delaying, anl de-Ir:uding his cre(litors." Jfel,that it was error not to submitto the
jury the isne as to the intent to defraud : Bcet.lcy v. B,'y, S. Ct.
N. C., Oct. 10, 1887.
In order to impeach an absolute conveyance on the ground that
it was made fi)r the purpose of hindering, delaying, and (le frauding
the creditors of the vendor, it must appear that the vendee participated in the fraud: Id.

De.fence of Fraud-Sqffieeney on AppeaL-In an action against
the vendee to enforce a vendor's lien, defendant pleaded "that said
conveyance was not made for any good or valuable consideration,
)ut with intent and fir the express purpose to hinder, delay, and
defraud the creditors" of the vendor. The plaintiff failed to object
to the sufficiency of the plea of fraud, and at tile trial evidence was
admitted to the effect that the plaintiff at the time of making the
conveyance was largely indebted; also other and conflicting evidence upon the question of fraud between tile parties. T ld, that
no objection havi.'g been made to the sufficiency of the plea of fraud
it was sufficient t, sustain, under tile evidence, the court's finding
that the conveyance was fraudulent: Reeoz v. Kinkead, S. Ct. Nev.,
Sep. 10, 1887.
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FRAUDs,STATUTE OF.

Memorandum-Letter.-A person made a parol agreement to
convey land to his mother, as evidence of which the contents of a
letter from him to his sister was testified to, the testimony being as
follows: "He said that he was in great trouble, and that he had to
have assistance from some source or other, and if his mother could
assist him in any way, he was willing to relinquish all interest in
the land in controversy to procure the money that he desired."
Held, that even though the letter itself containing this language
had been intr6duced in evidence, the writing would not have been
a sufficient compliance with the statute of frauds for a court of
equity to decree specific performance of the contract: Boozer v.
Teague, S. Ct. S. C., 1887.
GuARxrTy.

See Estoppel.

Instrument Construed-JointLiability.-The following writing is
sufficient evidence of intention to create a joint liability:
" DETROIT, August 27, 1885.
"We, the undersigned, do hereby agree that all brick delivered
to this building on corner of Hastings and Catherine streets for
Mr. Finn, which is the proprietor of said building, shall be responsible of said brick for same building." (Signed by three persons):
Golden v. Finn,S. Ct. Mich., Oct. 20,1887.
GuARDiAN AND WARD.
See Infants.
Final ettlement-Validity.-A final settlement of a resigned
guardian, made during the infancy of a non-resident ward, service
being had on the ward by order of publication, and no guardian
al litem being appointed, is ex parte, and, at the election of the
ward, may be disregarded; and a recital, in the decree discharging
the guardian, that the ward was then of full age, is not a bar to a
proceeding in chancery by the ward for the settlement of the guardanship: Turrentine v. Daly, S. Ct. Ala., July 19,1887.

HUSBANID AND WIFE. See Infants.
Fi'raudulent Conveyane--Land Bought at Foreclosure.-The
maker of a promissory note gave certain mortgages to secure his
indorsers. In consideration of the payment by J., a brother of the
maker, of a portion of the amount due on the note, the mortgages
were transferred to J. ; and, upon foreclosure, the title to the property passed to his wife. Afterwards the amount advanced by J.
was repaid to him. In an action by one of the indorsers to set
aside the conveyance to the wife as fraudulent, she maintained that
the money advanced on the note was hers, although in the answer it
was averred that the husband had advanced the money. The'evidence showed that, if the money was the wife's, it went into the
transaction as a loan to her husband. Held, that the wife was not
a bona fide purchaser: Anthony v. Boyd, S. Ct. R. I., July 30,
1887.
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INFANTS.

('i'el mnd Inhuman T,'etoi-a-Cutody of (hil.-When it
appears lrom the evidence in divorce proceedingz- that the plailtiff;
during her married lil with the deendant, hia; heel ,ubjeettd to
the limst crud. and hihuman treatment, and has l,,.'n compelled to
leave the def.ndant on account of hik cruelty al tyranny ill order
to save herself and child from injury, the custody of the child
should be given to the mother: Pntml v. lAnly, S. Ct. Wis.,.
1867.
INJUNCTION.

1i.',ut,', Qi,v'.i.on of L ut,-P,'erlimintry .]U,?dOil-AppY1.-A.

(omlplainant is not entitled t0 an interlocutory injunction when the
]eual right on which he rests his claim depend- on a (lisputed questioni of law: D, hbva',, L. & I. If. Co. v. G ideal Stoek 1'ord, Ct.
Chan. N. J., Sept. 12, 188,7.
Where, on an a)plication for a preliminarv inijunction, an order
to show cause is granted, with an ad inlerim injunction order, and the
court subsequently refluses an injunction on the ground that the law
right depends
lompjdiat'sis unsettled, the in unction
on which
order will not be continued in force pending tle appeal : Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Li, iflih, !f L,mdlord to kep Premi.e. in R,'pa;,.-Plaintiffs
leased anl occupied with a1dry-goodsstore the lower floor of defindalit's buildin,, the second floor of which was occupied by other
tenants. Upon the second floor was a water-closet, under the coltro of, thett.tants, lit over which defendant exercised no control,
and which she was under no obligat ion by contract to carc for. By
improper use of some unknowniperson the closet hecamne ol)structed
and the water overflowed and damaged plaintit[.
1r.1l, in an action
Jbr these damages, that defendant was not liable : Knny v. Burne. ,

S. Ct. Mich., Oct. 20, 1887.
LIMITATION.

The time during which defendant resided outside of the State
will he deducted on the trial of a plea of the statute to a note:
Palmer v. ,foe,
S. Ct. Maine, 1887.
.MASTER

AND SERVANT.

.,9iii ent U.. of Dfeive Applmzee..-In an action by an employce for damages f)r personal injuries, caused by the negligence
of his eml)loVer itl using defective appliances, where there is prbnmt
fiat.' proof of the negligence charged, an instruction " that to overcome such pria. ftae evidence of negligence the burden of proof
is upon defendant, and unless the defendant establish, by t clear
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preponderance of evidence," the exercise of proper care, he is guilty
of negligence, is erroneous: Puget Sound Ion Co. v. Lawrence, S.
Ct. Wash. Ter., July 25, 1887.
1juryfrom Defective Appliance-Province of Jury.-An employee
in a furniture factory was killed by a knife flying out of a rapidly
revolving shaper-head the first time it was used, and as soon as it
reached its highest velocity, before it was applied to cutting lumber
to be worked. The shaper-head was invented by and made after a
plan furnished by one of the principal managers of the furniture
company. It'differed in some respects from other heads in use, and
particularly in the device to check the tendency of the knife to fly
out of its socket. In an action to recover damages against the employer, the court held there was no evidence of negligence, and
ordered a verdict for defendant. Held, that the fact that the knife
did fly out when fastened in as well as it was designed to be had a
tendency to prove that the design was bad, and that the question
whether it was a reasonably safe implement and properly designed,
and whether the principle involved in it was not a departure from
safe methods as before applied, should have been submitted to the
jury. SHERWOOD, J., dissenting: Marshallv. Widdicomb Furniture Co., S. Cc. Mich., Oct. 13,1887.
Fellow-Servants--Superintenkdent of Mine-Contributory Negligence.-A foreman having entire supervision of a mine and all its
workings, employing and discharging laborers and prescribing their
duties, is not a co-employee within the rule which exempts the
master from responsibility for the injuries received by a servant
through the negligence of a fellow-servant: Reddon v. Union Pav.
B. Co., S. Ct. Utah, Oct. 1, 1887.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries received
while at work in defendant's mines, the testimony of the plaintiff
was to the effect that certain places in the mine had become dangerous by reason of the settling of the base of the columns or partitions left to support the roof of the mine, which caused masses of
rock and coal to fall from the top and sides; that, after a portion
of the dangerous section had been cased and timbered, the defendant's superintendent directed the work stopped, saying that he would
timber it at another time; that coal and other material continued
to fall from the sides and roof of the untimbered sections, which
was known to both the plaintiff and the superintendent; that three
or four days before the accident, plaintiff called the superintendent's attention to the unsafe condition of the section beyond the
timbering, upon which the superintendent assured plaintiff that
there was no danger, but promised to have it made secure. Subsequently lhe plaintiff, at the superintendent's direction, went to
work at a place beyond the timbering, but not at the particular
place to which he had previously called the superintendent's attention, and was injured by a fall of coal from the sides of the mine.
Held, that a motion for nonsuit was properly overruled; the question whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by re-
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maining in defendant's employ with knowledge of the danger,
being for the jury: Id.
MORTGAGE.

Chattel Mfortgage-Consideration-Releaseof Claims.-A. purchased a span of horses from B., giving his note therefor, with C.
and D. as sureties. To induce C. to sign the note as surety, A.
promised to execute a chattel mortgage on said property to C.; and
further agreed thai, until the execution of said mortgage, C. should
retain a lien on said property. Afterwards A. executed a mortgage
to one E. on said property, and soon afterwards left the State without having executed a mortgage to C. D. thereupon, in consideration that C. would release his claim on the property, executed
a chattel mortgage upon other property to secure C. against payment of a part or all of the note held by B. fHeld, that the mortgage from D. to C. was not without a consideration: Sparks v.
J Thon, S. Ct. Neb., 1887.
Agreement between, Mortgagorand Mortgagee-Rights of Assignee.
-A note and mortgage were given, the partial consideration of
which was the promise of the mortgagee to assume and pay a prior
mortgage upon the land. This prior mortgage was not paid by the
mortgagee, but was afterwards paid by the assignee of the last mortgage, who kuew nothing of the promise of the mortgagee to pay
debt, andsowho
took
the an
promissory
of the
the last
mortgagee
for
the amount
paid,
under
agreementnotethat
note and
for
security
as
assigned
been
previously
had
which
mortgage,
another debt due from the mortgagee to the assignee, should also
be security for the amount so paid. In an action for the foreclosure
of the last mortgage by the assignee, held, that the mortgagor was
entitled to no reduction in the amount to be recovered because of
the failure of the mortgagee to pay the prior mortgage. Upon the
assignment of the mortgage, the equities between the mortgagee
and assignee became fixed, and the fact that the latter subsequently
ascertained that the mortgagee had assumed and promised to pay
the debt does not diminish his legal or equitable right to hold the
note and mortgage as collateral security for the full amount of the
mortgagee's indebtedness: Blakely v. Twining, S. Ct. Wis., Sept. 20,
1887.
Foreelosure-Release-Priorities.-Inan action to foreclose a
mortgage, given by the defendant M., conditioned to pay in one
year from its date certain overdrafts by her husband, a member of
the firm of S. & Son, amounting to $1,500, held, that deposits of the
firm, made before the expiration of the year, in pursuance of a prior
agreement that they might be withdrawn and used in the firm business, did not operate as an extinguishment of the overdrafts existing at the time the mortgage was given, and consequently did not
release the lien of the mortgage, so as to give a junior mortgagee a
priority of lien: Sawyer v. Senn, S. Ct. S. C., Aug. 22, 1887.
Subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, a note for the sum
of $1,500 was made by the defendant M. to S. & Son, and by them
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transferred to the plaintiff, who gave them credit for the amount on
their deposit account. The note- was given to change the form of
the firm's indebtedness to the bank from overdrafts to bankable
paper, in order that the plaintiff might make a better showing to
the comptroller of the currency. Afterwards the note was returned
canceled, and the mortgage, which in the meantime bad remained
in plaintiff's possession, was revived. Held, that, as the note vas
never intended as a payment of the overdrafts, it did not operate
as a release of the mortgage, and that the junior mortgagee, whose
debt was not created until after this transaction, was not entitled to
a priority of lien: Id.
Deed of Trust-Successive Foreelosures.-Realestate held in trust
as security for the payment of three purchase-money notes was sold
by the trustee under power of sale, and bid in by the assignee of
the first note in satisfaction thereof. The debtor redeemed, and the
holder of the other two notes brought suit for the forclosure of the
trust deed. The evidence showed that the assignee of the first note
bid in the land for about one-third its value; that the assignee, the
trustee, and the debtor all knew that the two notes were still outstanding at the time of sale; that the debtor knew the sale was
made in satisfaction of the assignee's debt only. Held, that the
last two notes were still a lien on the land, and entitled to an equity
of satisfaction with the first one: Shields v. Dyer, S. Ct. Tenn.,
Oct. 5, 1887.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Negligence-Defective Sidewals-Notice.-Where there was evidence from which the jury might have found that a defect caused by
an accumulation of snow and ice had existed for nine days on a
frequented sidewalk, which during that time was patrolled by a policeman, and several times passed by one of the selectmen of defendant town, held, that these facts clearly afforded evidence of notice
of the defect and of negligence in not remedying it: Fortin v. Ahabitantsof .Easthamlpton,S. C. Mass., Oct. 21, 1887.
Taxation of Insurance Company-Assets-Reserve Fund-Statutory Percentageon Capital tok-Exemption.-The contingent liability of an insurance companyto pay losses, and to refund unearned
premiums, is not an indebtedness which may be deducted from its
assets when listing its property for taxation; and in the absence of
a provision of its charter, or of a statute to the contrary, a fund required by statute to be reserved free from dividends, consisting of
certain securities, interest, and the amount received from premiums
upon unexpired policies, declared to be unearned premiums is liable
to municipal taxation: Kenton Ins. Co. v. City of Covington, C.
App. Ky., Oct. 27, 1887.
The legislative requirement that an insurance company pay into
the treasury a certain percentage upon its capital stock does not
exempt it from further taxation, or from taxation for municipal
purposes, in the absence of such an exemption in its charter, or in
any statute: Id.

